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INTRODUCTION 
On May 2, 2006, Joseph Lewis Clark was executed by lethal 
injection in Ohio for the 1984 murder of David Manning, a twenty-
three-year-old gas station attendant.1  After prison personnel spent 
twenty-five minutes searching for a suitable vein, an “agitated” Clark 
raised his head and declared, “It don’t work,” five times.2  During a 
second attempt, which spanned thirty minutes, witnesses reported 
hearing Clark moan and cry out.3  At one point, Clark requested that 
prison officials give him “something by mouth to end this.”4  Finally, 
nearly ninety minutes after the procedure was initiated, Clark was 
pronounced dead.5  An autopsy report later revealed alarming 
evidence that Clark had been punctured with the needle nineteen 
times and had not been properly injected with the lethal drugs.6
The botched execution of Joseph Lewis Clark illustrates the 
modern legal controversy surrounding the administration of lethal 
injection in the United States.7  In recent years there has been a 
 
 1. John Provance & Christina Hall, Clark Execution Raises Lethal-Injection Issues, 
BLADE, May 4, 2006, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Adam Liptak, Trouble Finding Inmate’s Vein Slows Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 2006, at A16; see also MICHAEL L. RADELET, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SOME 
EXAMPLES OF POST-FURMAN BOTCHED EXECUTIONS (2008), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions 
(providing examples of botched executions, including Joseph Clark’s). 
 4. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, IV Fiasco Led Killer To Ask for Plan B, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, May 12, 2006, at E1. 
 5. RADELET, supra note 3 (“[W]itnesses later reported that they heard ‘moaning, 
crying out and guttural noises.’”) (citing Alan Johnson, ‘It Don’t Work,’ Inmate Says 
During Botched Execution, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 3, 2006, at 1A). 
 6. See Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research on 
Prisoners, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2008) (“Misplacing the drugs in this 
manner would minimize the effectiveness of the anesthesia and make it much more 
likely that Mr. Clark was aware of the severe pain associated with awareness of the 
heart-stopping action of the final drug in the sequence.”); see also Jim Provance, 
Victim’s Relative Sides with Killer’s Kin, BLADE, May 30, 2007, at A3 (discussing how 
Clark’s execution was so disturbing that Manning’s brother, a witness to the 
execution, publicly denounced the procedure as excessively cruel). 
 7. Clark’s botched execution was one of at least twenty-nine botched lethal 
injection executions over the past three decades.  See RADELET, supra note 3 
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significant increase in litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
lethal injection, as new evidence has ignited concerns that the 
process by which it is administered may subject inmates to an 
excruciating death.8  This controversy culminated in the United 
States Supreme Court’s April 16, 2008, decision in Baze v. Rees.9  In 
Baze, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Kentucky’s 
three-drug lethal injection protocol, which two death row inmates 
argued created an “‘unnecessary risk’ of pain,” in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.10  In fact, the Supreme Court has never held an 
execution method unconstitutional.11  Baze marked only the second 
time in history that the Supreme Court considered such a challenge;12 
the first was in 1878, when it upheld the constitutionality of the firing 
squad.13
The Supreme Court decided Baze the same day it heard oral 
arguments in Kennedy v. Louisiana,14 a case challenging the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing the death penalty 
for the rape of a child.15  The petitioner, Patrick Kennedy, was 
convicted of the aggravated rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter in 
a crime so brutal that the Court found it impossible to describe “in a 
way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on his 
victim or . . . the revulsion society, and the jury that represents it, 
sought to express by sentencing [Kennedy] to death.”16  The Supreme 
Court struck down Louisiana’s statute as unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment, reasoning that a national consensus and the 
Court’s own informed judgment reflected a determination that death 
 
(cataloging, in a non-exhaustive list, the forty-one best known botched executions 
since 1982, including many in which lethal injection was the method of execution). 
 8. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. 
Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004); Cooey v. Taft, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 65480 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2007); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 
(N.D. Cal. 2006); Walker v. Johnson, 448 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Va. 2006); Evans v. 
Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D. Md. 2006); Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018, 2006 WL 
3914717 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006); State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del. 1994); Bieghler 
v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 2005); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 
292 (Tenn. 2005). 
 9. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 1529. 
 11. Id. at 1530. 
 12. See John Gibeaut, Tinkering with Lethal Injection:  An Eighth Amendment 
Challenge Comes Before the High Court, 94 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2008) (discussing the buzz 
among members of the capital litigation bar when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Baze). 
 13. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
 14. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 15. Id. at 2646. 
 16. Id. 
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was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape where the 
victim did not die.17
Kennedy continues a series of cases decided over the past several 
decades through which the Supreme Court has gradually narrowed 
the types of crimes and classes of offenders a state may punish by 
death.18  In recognition of the “evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society,” a standard first articulated 
in Trop v. Dulles,19 the Court has held death to be a disproportionate 
penalty for the crimes of rape of an adult woman,20 felony murder,21 
and murder committed by a juvenile22 or mentally retarded 
defendants.23  This Comment will argue that, while the Court’s 
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has gradually reduced the 
circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed, this 
trend is inconsistent with the Court’s unwillingness to critically 
examine the specific procedures states use to execute, even in the 
face of growing concerns over the humaneness of such procedures. 
Part I of this Comment gives a historic overview of the Court’s 
limited method-of-execution jurisprudence, followed by a review of 
the Court’s recent line of rulings on challenges to the death penalty’s 
proportionality.  This Comment then examines the evolution of 
execution methods leading to the near universal use of lethal 
 
 17. Id. at 2649–64 (explaining that a “proportionality” analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment includes considering whether a particular punishment is “graduated 
and proportionate to [the] offense” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 
367 (1910)) (alterations in original).  Louisiana petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
rehearing in September 2008, arguing that a military law authorizing the death 
penalty for the rape of a child had been overlooked by both parties and the Court.  
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).  The State claimed this oversight 
undermined the Court’s conclusion that there was no national consensus favoring 
capital punishment for child rape.  Id. at 3.  The Court denied the petition for 
rehearing on October 1, 2008.  Id. at 2 (“[A]uthorization of the death penalty in the 
military sphere does not indicate that the penalty is constitutional in the civilian 
context.”). 
 18. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2654 (citing the Court’s earlier determination in 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976), that death, because of its “severity and 
irrevocability,” must be limited to the most grievous crimes).  But see FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 184 (2003) 
(suggesting that the Court’s recent willingness to limit the imposition of the death 
penalty may be attributable to a reaction by the Court’s moderate Justices against its 
conservative stance on the death penalty as compared to the legal community as a 
whole, and citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as “the most prominent 
example of this trend”). 
 19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).  In Trop, the Court held that denationalization for the 
crime of desertion offended the “principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the 
Eighth Amendment” and was thus unconstitutional.  Id. at 99–101. 
 20. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 21. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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injection in the United States.  Finally, Part I discusses Baze’s 
significance in light of the lack of a uniform constitutional standard 
for reviewing method-of-execution challenges,24 and then evaluates 
the Court’s splintered ruling. 
 Part II analyzes Baze within the broader context of the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence.  Specifically, it 
argues that the Court’s gradual restriction of the administration of 
the death penalty with respect to certain classes of offenders and 
categories of crimes is inconsistent with its near indifference to the 
specific procedures states use to execute.  Part III discusses the 
implications of the Baze decision and concludes with 
recommendations for states going forward with lethal injection and 
courts reviewing method-of-execution challenges. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Historic Overview of Method-of-Execution Challenges 
In drafting the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction 
of “cruel and unusual punishments,”25 the Framers of the 
Constitution “were primarily concerned . . . with proscribing 
‘tortures’ and other ‘barbarous’ methods of punishment.”26  At the 
time, capital punishment was authorized in every state.27
 
 24. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:  Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 319, 333–48 (1997) [hereinafter Denno, Executions] (discussing the 
“scant guidance” the Court has offered for reviewing method-of-execution challenges 
and how the Court often dismisses such cases on procedural grounds); Deborah W. 
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death:  The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of 
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 67, 69–
77 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Legislatures] (“The United States Supreme Court[] 
[has shown a] complete constitutional disregard for how inmates are executed, 
irrespective of a century-long pattern of horrifying, and entirely preventable, mishaps 
linked to all execution methods.”). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–71 (1976) (describing the history of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and its application in early Supreme Court 
cases that focused on the constitutionality of specific execution methods); see also 
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:”  The Original 
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–65 (1969) (discussing the adoption of the “cruel 
and unusual punishments” clause by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution from the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689); Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney:  
Analyzing the (Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 
155–56 (1996) (“The English adopted this prohibition [on cruel and unusual 
punishments] in response to the Stuart regime’s frequent use of torture and other 
barbaric measures against English subjects.  These concerns followed the colonists 
across the Atlantic to the New World.”) (citation omitted). 
 27. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–77 (asserting that capital punishment was 
considered an acceptable form of punishment by the Framers of the Constitution 
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Prior to its decision in Baze, the last time the Supreme Court 
squarely considered the constitutionality of a specific execution 
method was in Wilkerson v. Utah.28  Wilkerson was convicted of first 
degree murder in the Utah territory and challenged his sentence of 
death by public shooting.29  Noting the difficulty of defining the 
precise parameters of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” the Supreme Court held that death by firing 
squad was not constitutionally proscribed.30  According to the Court, 
drawing and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and 
disemboweling, and other circumstances where “terror, pain or 
disgrace were . . . superadded,” would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.31 However, the Court reasoned that death by firing 
squad did not fall within this category because it was the common 
method used to punish military offenses at the time,32 and concluded 
that Wilkerson’s sentence was constitutional.33
Since its ruling in Wilkerson, the Supreme Court has only addressed 
the constitutionality of execution methods indirectly.  In In re 
Kemmler,34 the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to 
New York’s electrocution statute, concluding that the Eighth 
Amendment was not incorporated against the states,35 and deferred 
 
and that its existence was contemplated by the Fifth Amendment, and subsequently, 
the Fourteenth). 
 28. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
 29. Id. at 130–31. 
 30. Id. at 134–36. 
 31. Id. at 135.  
 32. See id. at 135 (“Soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military 
offenses are in the great majority of cases sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for 
such occasions is given in great fulness by the writers upon the subject of courts-
martial.”). 
 33. Id. at 136.  Incidentally, as Wilkerson’s sentence was carried out, he moved 
just enough for the bullets to miss his heart.  He bled to death for twenty-seven 
minutes in front of a stunned crowd.  See Gilbert King, Op-Ed, Cruel and Unusual 
History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A21 (criticizing the Baze decision and the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence generally for ignoring a history of 
botched executions). 
 34. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).  William Kemmler was the first prisoner sentenced to 
death by electrocution.  See Harding, supra note 26, at 158–60 (discussing how the 
Kemmler decision demonstrated the limitations of the historical interpretation test of 
evaluating execution methods in the face of advancing technology). 
 35. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447–49.  This proposition was later overturned by the 
Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).  Robinson held that a California 
law criminalizing narcotics addiction, even where the defendant was not engaged in 
illegal conduct at the time of his arrest and where there was no evidence he had ever 
used a narcotic in the state, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 666. 
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to the legislature’s finding that electrocution was humane.36  Though 
holding on incorporation grounds, the Court stated that under the 
Eighth Amendment “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve 
torture or a lingering death[,]” and “[‘cruel’] implies . . . something 
inhuman and barbarous,—something more than the mere 
extinguishment of life.”37  Following Kemmler, states proceeded with 
executions by electrocution, many of which were “grotesque failures, 
including William Kemmler’s.”38
Fifty-seven years later, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,39 the 
Supreme Court held that it would not be “cruel and unusual” to 
execute “Lucky” Willie Francis, whose first execution by electrocution 
was botched due to a mechanical malfunction.40  The Court reasoned 
that an “unforeseeable accident” did not amount to “the wanton 
infliction of pain” barred by the Eighth Amendment.41  Francis was 
executed by electrocution four months later.42
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the death 
penalty generally in Furman v. Georgia,43 in which it struck down 
Georgia’s death penalty statute because it could result in arbitrary 
sentencing,44 effectively invalidating all death penalty laws then in 
 
 36. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“[I]t was for the legislature to say in what 
manner sentence of death should be executed . . . [and] this act was passed in the 
effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result . . . .”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 336 n.92 (referring to Kemmler’s 
execution as a “well-publicized technical and medical bungle”); see also Denno, 
Legislatures, supra note 24, at 73–74 (“Kemmler’s mishap was a blight on the memory 
of state legislatures . . . [yet e]lectrocution quickly became a popular means of 
execution in other states, despite comparable reports of mishaps and botches.”). 
 39. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
 40. See id. at 464 (rejecting the argument that forcing Francis to go through the 
“psychological strain” of preparing for electrocution a second time would subject 
him to a lingering and unnecessarily cruel death); see also King, supra note 33 
(discussing Francis’s case as “[p]erhaps the most egregious” capital punishment case 
to come before the Supreme Court). 
 41. Francis, 329 U.S. at 463–64.  But see id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the judgment but acknowledging the possibility that a “hypothetical 
situation” involving a “series of abortive attempts at electrocution or even a single, 
cruelly willful attempt” might lead to a different outcome). 
 42. See Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death 
Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 792–93 (2008) (citing Francis as 
an example of the ineffectiveness of early constitutional challenges to methods of 
execution). 
 43. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 44. See id. at 255–57 (“[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in 
imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding 
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, 
or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by 
social position may be in a more protected position.”). 
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place nationwide.45  The Court later upheld Georgia’s revised death 
penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia,46 reasoning that the Eighth 
Amendment’s meaning is informed by society’s “‘evolving standards 
of decency’” and that the punishment must not be “excessive.”47  The 
Court described “excessive” as involving “the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” and being “grossly out of proportion to the severity 
of the crime.”48  The Gregg decision signaled an end to post-Furman 
suspension of executions;49 states began to enact new death penalty 
statutes to conform to Gregg’s constitutional requirements.50
B. Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty’s Proportionality 
During the thirty-two years since Gregg, the Supreme Court, in a 
series of rulings addressing the death penalty’s proportionality, has 
progressively limited the circumstances under which states may 
administer capital punishment.51  Considering “the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”52 the Court 
 
 45. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 69–70 (discussing the effect of the Furman 
decision as “implying a new set of federally determined principles that state death 
penalty laws would have to satisfy to conform to the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment,” and signaling a departure from the historic autonomy states enjoyed 
with respect to capital punishment procedures). 
 46. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  In Gregg, the Court considered Georgia’s revised capital 
sentencing procedures, which required that the judge or jury find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, at least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances before 
imposing a death sentence.  Id. at 196–97. 
 47. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 81, 99 (1958)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 49–50 (discussing the resumption of executions 
following Gregg as a “critical event” in the transformation of American’s image with 
respect to capital punishment). 
 50. Id. at 76. 
 51. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (discussing the 
“tension” in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence between establishing 
bright-line rules and considering the circumstances of each individual case, to which 
the Court has responded by narrowing the circumstances under which capital 
punishment may be imposed). 
 52. The Supreme Court first articulated this phrase in the 1958 case of Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), in which it opined that the exact meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment is “not static.”  This was not an entirely new concept as the Court 
had earlier stated in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), that the cruel 
and unusual punishments clause “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”  This 
enduring phrase has informed the Court’s modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–70 (1989) (“In 
determining what standards have ‘evolved,’ . . . we have looked not to our own 
conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole . . . . 
This approach is dictated both by the language of the Amendment—which 
proscribes only those punishments that are both ‘cruel and unusual’—and by the 
‘deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal 
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has looked to objective indicators to determine whether a challenged 
punishment is in line with contemporary values.53
In Coker v. Georgia,54 the Supreme Court considered whether the 
death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of the 
rape of an adult woman.55  Applying the principles of its earlier ruling 
in Gregg, the Court looked for “objective evidence of the country’s 
present judgment concerning the acceptability of rape of an adult 
woman”56 by reviewing public opinion, legislative judgments, and the 
response of juries.57  In addition to considering these objective 
factors, the Court determined that its own judgment would “be 
brought to bear on the question of” whether a punishment is 
unconstitutional.58  In light of both the objective evidence and its own 
informed judgment, the Court found “a sentence of death [to be] 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of 
rape.”59
The Court reflected this line of reasoning in Enmund v. Florida,60 
where it held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the 
imposition of a death sentence for the crime of felony murder.61  
Enmund was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in 
a robbery in which a murder was committed, even though he 
“himself did not kill or attempt to kill.”62  In reaching its conclusion 
the Court again deferred to the judgment of a majority of state 
legislatures that death was an excessive punishment, this time for the 
crime of felony murder.63
More recently, in Atkins v. Virginia64 and Roper v. Simmons,65 the 
Court held the death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment 
 
system.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976))), overruled by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
 54. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 55. Id. at 592. 
 56. Id. at 593. 
 57. See id. at 593–97 (asserting that the fact that Georgia is the only jurisdiction 
allowing the death penalty for rape when the victim is an adult woman militates in 
favor of a finding that such a punishment is disproportionate). 
 58. Id. at 597. 
 59. Id. at 592. 
 60. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 61. Id. at 788. 
 62. Id. at 798. 
 63. Id. at 801.  But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 146–58 (1987) 
(distinguishing Enmund and holding that death may be imposed for the crime of 
felony murder where the defendants did not themselves kill the victims, but where 
their participation in the events leading up to the murders was active, recklessly 
indifferent, and substantial). 
 64. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
 65. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
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for crimes committed by the mentally retarded or juveniles, 
respectively.  Previously, in Penry v. Lynaugh,66 the Court refused to 
find that two states’ prohibition on executing individuals suffering 
from mental illness constituted national consensus.67  In Atkins, 
however, after discussing the change in the legislative landscape since 
its earlier ruling, the Court opined that the growing number of states 
prohibiting execution of the mentally ill reflects a strong national 
consensus against authorizing the death penalty for such offenders.68  
Likewise in Roper, the Court overruled its 1989 decision in Stanford v. 
Kentucky69 and found significant evidence of a national consensus 
against executing juveniles because thirty states prohibited the death 
penalty for juveniles, and in the states without a formal prohibition, 
the execution of juveniles was rare.70  Finally, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
the Supreme Court recently held that death is a disproportionate 
punishment for the crime of the rape of a child when the victim does 
not die.71
C. Toward a More Humane Method of Execution:   
The Use of Lethal Injection in the United States 
The evolution of execution methods in the United States reflects a 
historical trend toward finding more humane methods of execution.72  
This trend has culminated in the near universal use of lethal injection 
 
 66. 492 U.S. 302, 302 (1989) (finding that evidence showing that only two states 
prohibited a sentence of death for a mentally retarded offender was insufficient to 
demonstrate a national consensus), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (noting that thirty states proscribe the death 
penalty for the mentally ill, and stating that this number is less significant than “the 
consistency of the direction of change”). 
 69. 492 U.S. at 361 (finding a lack of a national consensus against executing 
juveniles because twenty-two of the thirty-seven death penalty states permit it for 
sixteen-year-old offenders, and twenty-five permit it for seventeen-year-olds). 
 70. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (explaining the slower pace of change as 
compared to Atkins as the result of the earlier recognition by states of the 
impropriety of executing juveniles). 
 71. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651–58 (2008) (reasoning that only six states permit the 
death penalty for the crime of child rape, with no sign this number is growing, and 
pointing out that no one has been executed for the rape of a child since 1964). 
 72. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526–27 (2008) (discussing the use of 
hanging in the nineteenth century, followed by electrocution, then lethal gas, and 
ultimately lethal injection).  But see Denno, Legislatures, supra note 24, at 65 
(“[L]egislatures typically change an execution method only to stay one step ahead of 
a looming constitutional challenge to that method because the acceptability of the 
death penalty process itself therefore becomes jeopardized.”). 
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as the preferred method of execution among states administering 
capital punishment.73
Support for lethal injection gained momentum in the wake of 
Gregg as legislatures began to reexamine the death penalty and 
execution procedures.74  Lethal injection was attractive to 
policymakers both for its apparent humaneness75 and for its relative 
low cost compared to other methods of execution.76
Lethal injection was first adopted by Oklahoma in 1977.77  “No 
committee hearings, research, or expert testimony was presented 
prior to final passage of the bill,” and the exact combination and 
quantities of drugs to be used were not identified.78  The three-drug 
protocol was later developed by Oklahoma’s Chief Medical Examiner, 
Dr. Jay Chapman.79  Chapman had no relevant expertise, did not 
consult any other medical professionals, and later expressed concern 
about the protocol’s proper administration.80  When applying the 
 
 73. See Death Penalty Information Center, Lethal Injection:  Drugs Used in 
Various States, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-moratorium-
executions-ends-after-supreme-court-decision#drugs (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) 
[hereinafter Drugs Used in Various States] (noting that thirty-five of the thirty-six 
death penalty states authorize lethal injection executions); see also Dieter, supra note 
42, at 798 (“Since the start of 2000, ninety-eight percent of the country’s executions 
have been carried out by lethal injection.”). 
 74. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 50–51 (describing how states resuming capital 
punishment faced “image problems” associated with antiquated execution 
mechanisms and “needed . . . a new method of execution that could appear to be 
both humane and efficient, a symbol of scientific progress in the service of modern 
capital punishment,” and that lethal injection was viewed as the solution); cf. 
Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:  How Medicine Has Dismantled the 
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 64 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] 
(discussing how lethal injection was first examined as a possible execution method by 
a New York state commission in 1888, but was ultimately passed over in favor of 
electrocution, partly out of concern by the medical community that the public would 
associate the medical profession with death). 
 75. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 798 (“With lethal injections, offenders are put to 
sleep, and dispatched with as much decorum as putting down a long-valued animal.  
Lethal injections were not meant to be spectacles or to horrify the offender . . . . The 
state was confident that witnesses would report seeing a peaceful death.”). 
 76. See Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the 
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 770 (2008) (discussing the role of 
economics in the decision by Oklahoma legislators to adopt lethal injection, as the 
state’s electric chair required $62,000 in repairs and the cost of a new gas chamber 
was projected at $300,000, while lethal injection was estimated to cost only $70 to 
administer). 
 77. See Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed?  A Look at 
Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 445, 452–
54 (2007) (discussing the origins of the first lethal injection protocol and statute). 
 78. Id. at 453. 
 79. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 65–68 (explaining that Oklahoma 
legislators approached Chapman after medical societies refused to offer assistance). 
 80. See id. at 66–69 (“By all accounts, . . . Chapman was the major, if not the 
primary, creator of lethal injection.  At the same time, he remains shocked by reports 
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three-drug protocol, lethal injection administrators use sodium 
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.81  The 
first drug, a fast-acting barbiturate, induces unconsciousness; the 
second, a paralytic agent, inhibits all movement, including breathing; 
the third stops the heart by inducing cardiac arrest.82
Over time, other states adopted lethal injection.83  In 1982, Texas 
became the first state to carry out an execution by lethal injection 
when it executed Charles Brooks, Jr., “in a botched procedure.”84  
Thirty-five of the thirty-six death penalty states now use lethal 
injection,85 which is commonly considered the most humane method 
of execution.86  While protocols vary across jurisdictions, thirty of the 
thirty-five states with lethal injection use the same combination of 
drugs challenged by the petitioners in Baze.87
Lethal injection came under fire following a 2005 study published 
in a British medical journal, The Lancet.88  This study discussed the risk 
that if the sodium thiopental anesthetic were improperly 
administered, the drug could wear off too quickly, leaving the inmate 
in excruciating pain during the execution as the effects of the 
potassium chloride were felt, but unable to cry out as the 
pancuronium bromide-induced paralysis set in.89  In comparison, 
 
that lethal injection generally is not performed by doctors but rather by individuals 
with little to no familiarity with the procedure.”) (citations omitted). 
 81. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527 (2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 78 (describing how, from 1977 to 
2002, states began to adopt lethal injection in a “fast-moving cascade of multistate 
clusters”); see also Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection?, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV., Mar. 3, 2008, at 2 (2008), http://www.hlpronline.com/Alper.pdf 
(“[T]here is ‘scant evidence that ensuing states’ adoption of lethal injection was 
supported by any additional medical or scientific studies that the adopted form of 
lethal injection was an acceptable alternative to other methods.  Rather, . . . the 
various states simply fell in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s protocol . . . .’” 
(quoting Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 8, 
2005), aff’d, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008))).
 84. Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 375; see also Dieter, supra note 42, at 798 
(discussing how botched executions were considered “aberrations” and lethal 
injection was largely thought to be an “innovative, humane, and symbolic” method of 
execution). 
 85. Drugs Used in Various States, supra note 73 (noting that Nebraska uses the 
electric chair).  But see State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 279 (Neb. 2008) (holding that 
electrocution as a method of execution violates the Nebraska constitution), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 228 (2008). 
 86. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537. 
 87. See id. at 1532–33 (discussing the “probative” value of the consensus among 
states in favor of the three-drug lethal injection protocol). 
 88. Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for 
Execution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005). 
 89. See id. at 1412–14 (finding executioners in Texas and Virginia had no 
anesthesia training, and that forty-three percent of the executed inmates tested in 
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most states prohibit the use of paralyzing drugs in animal 
euthanasia.90  Although the findings reported in the Lancet are 
considered controversial,91 the study generated concerns over the 
humaneness of lethal injection and provided fuel to the increase in 
method-of-execution challenges over the past several years.92
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Jurisprudence and the Struggle  
for a Uniform Constitutional Test 
In a series of procedural rulings that allowed death row inmates to 
challenge methods of execution in federal courts through § 1983 civil 
rights actions,93 the Supreme Court opened the floodgates to lethal 
injection litigation over the past several years.94  The volume of this 
litigation has led to confusion as lower courts have applied a variety 
of different Eighth Amendment standards for reviewing method-of-
 
the study had such low concentrations of anesthesia as to be consistent with 
awareness). 
 90. See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience:  Lethal Injection and Animal 
Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 844 (2008) (noting forty-two states ban the use 
of paralyzing drugs in animal euthanasia, while the rest are silent on the issue); see 
also Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 76 (discussing the “shocking inconsistency” 
in how procedures for euthanizing animals demand “substantially more medical 
consultation and concern for humaneness” than those used to execute humans).  
But see Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535 (“[C]omparison to animal euthanasia . . . overlooks 
the States’ legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death.”). 
 91. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532 n.2 (noting that seven medical researchers 
criticized the reliability of the study in peer responses). 
 92. See Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2005–2006 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 311, 315 (“The Lancet article . . . became the focal point for new court 
challenges by death row defendants . . . assert[ing] that [it] provided new and 
compelling evidence that the standard three-drug lethal injection protocol violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”).  
Evidence of numerous botched executions suggests the risks analyzed by the Lancet 
study have indeed been realized.  See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 56–57 
(revealing some of the “disturbing details” exposed during lethal injection 
challenges, such as the subjection of a Kentucky prisoner to untrained executioners 
who inserted catheters into his neck, the apparent suffocation of an Ohio prisoner 
during the course of an almost two-hour execution, admissions by a doctor charged 
with monitoring a North Carolina prisoner’s level of consciousness that he had not 
done so, and the execution of a “tormented, conscious prisoner” in Florida). 
 93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (authorizing suits in federal court against state 
and local governments where a plaintiff alleges that someone violated one of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under color of state law); see also Hill v. 
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (reiterating Nelson v. Campbell in holding that 
Clarence Hill had an action to challenge Florida’s lethal injection procedure under § 
1983); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (ruling unanimously that a 
challenge to the constitutionality of an execution method could be brought as a civil 
rights claim under § 1983); Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 77, at 463–67 (detailing 
the procedures for challenging lethal injection protocols under § 1983). 
 94. See Berman, supra note 92, at 317–18 (discussing the “profound nationwide 
ripple effect” the Court’s decision in Hill had on lethal injection litigation, 
particularly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had 
ignored Nelson in reviewing Clarence Hill’s claim). 
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execution challenges.95  Some courts have applied a “substantial risk” 
standard,96 while others have applied a more stringent “unnecessary 
risk” standard.97  As one legal commentator has observed, this 
inconsistency is problematic because these “are two very different 
standards that could lead to disparate results.”98
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the differing 
legal standards applied by lower federal courts in the face of 
increased challenges to execution protocols reflected a growing need 
for a uniform constitutional test.99  On September 25, 2007, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear an appeal from the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Baze v. Rees.100
Death row inmates Ralph Baze and Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr., 
both convicted of murder in Kentucky and sentenced to death, 
argued before the United States Supreme Court that the appropriate 
standard to determine whether an execution method is constitutional 
is whether the method poses an “unnecessary risk” of pain and 
suffering.101  They argued that flaws in the lethal injection process102 
 
 95. See Alley v. Little, 447 F.3d 976, 977 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he dysfunctional patchwork of stays and executions going on in this country 
further undermines the various states’ effectiveness and ability to properly carry out 
death sentences.  We are currently operating under a system wherein condemned 
inmates are bringing nearly identical challenges to the lethal injection procedure.  In 
some instances stays are granted, while in others they are not and the defendants are 
executed, with no principled distinction to justify such a result.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying a 
“substantial foreseeable risk of the wanton infliction of pain” standard to uphold 
Missouri’s lethal injection execution protocol); Walker v. Johnson, 448 F. Supp. 2d 
719, 722 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing a challenge to Virginia’s lethal injection 
protocol, finding that it did not involve an “objective substantial risk of harm”). 
 97. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a 
challenge to California’s lethal injection method of execution as falling short of 
demonstrating an “unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain”); Cooey v. Taft, No. 
2:04-cv-1156, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65480, at *15–19 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2007) 
(applying an “unnecessary risk” standard and granting a stay of execution); Morales 
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding California’s lethal 
injection protocol created an “undue and unnecessary risk” of pain and directing the 
executive branch to address its numerous “critical deficiencies”). 
 98. Alison Nathan, Pausing the Machinery of Death:  The Supreme Court Takes Baze, 
JURIST, Sept. 27, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/09/pausing-
machinery-of-death-supreme.php. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006). 
 101. See Brief for Petitioners at 30–33, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-
5439) (arguing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently 
recognized that a punishment may not involve “the infliction of ‘unnecessary’ pain”) 
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 
329 U.S. 459 (1947), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130 (1878)). 
 102. See id. at 10–24 (identifying historical problems with Kentucky’s three-drug 
protocol, process problems with the State’s administration of the protocol—
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create a foreseeable risk of agonizing pain that the State could easily 
reduce or eliminate by adopting a different procedure.103  Kentucky 
argued the “substantial risk” test used by the courts below is the 
correct standard, and that the “unnecessary risk” standard would 
unduly burden states by forcing them to constantly fine-tune their 
procedures, no matter how minimal the risks associated with the 
current protocols were.104  The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari 
led to a nationwide de-facto moratorium on executions, as courts 
began staying executions pending the high court’s decision and 
further clarification on the appropriate Eighth Amendment 
standard.105
E. The Supreme Court’s Splintered Ruling in Baze 
While seven Justices agreed that Kentucky’s lethal injection 
protocols are constitutional, the Court was sharply divided as to the 
appropriate standard for evaluating the constitutionality of lethal 
injection.106  Six Justices who concurred in the judgment wrote 
separate opinions.107  The splintered ruling left some 
commentators,108 and even some Justices themselves,109 predicting that 
the decision will ultimately result in renewed efforts to challenge the 
way the death penalty is administered. 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, 
asserted that an execution procedure may not involve a “substantial 
 
including lack of proper training of execution team members and inadequate 
facilities—and evidence of botched executions in other states). 
 103. See id. at 24–25 n.12 (arguing that administration of a single dose of a 
thiopental or other barbiturate would be less prone to error, and noting 
veterinarians favor this method for animal euthanasia “because of its simplicity and 
humaneness”). 
 104. Brief for Respondents at 29–35, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439). 
 105. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 804 (discussing the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s grant of certiorari in Baze as marking the first time since Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972), that the United States has experienced a six-month period 
without a single execution). 
 106. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting that no clear 
standard for determining the constitutionality of a method of execution emerged 
from the plurality’s ruling). 
 107. Id. at 1525–38 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 1538–42 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 
1542–52 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1552–56 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1556–
63 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1563–67 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 108. See Adam Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, but Hardly the Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2008, at A26 (reporting predictions that the Court’s decision in Baze will 
cause increased litigation). 
 109. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring) (predicting that the 
plurality’s decision will result in an increase in future lethal injection litigation, 
because “we have left the States with nothing resembling a bright-line rule”). 
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risk of serious harm.”110  The risk of pain from an improper 
administration of the sodium thiopental, and Kentucky’s failure to 
adopt the purportedly safer alternatives, were not sufficient, a 
plurality of the Court held, to show that the challenged protocols 
were “objectively intolerable.”111  Roberts suggested that a state would 
be immune from challenges to its lethal injection protocols as long as 
the protocols were “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s, in light of 
available alternatives.112  “[T]he proffered alternatives,” under this 
standard, “must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.”113
In a separate opinion, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued that an 
execution method is constitutional unless it is “deliberately designed 
to inflict pain.”114  Justices Stevens and Breyer both agreed that 
Kentucky’s method was constitutional but took issue with Chief 
Justice Roberts’ rationale.115  Justice Stevens, denouncing capital 
punishment for the first time,116 suggested that states should 
reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide,117 the 
 
 110. Id. at 1529, 1532 (plurality opinion) (noting at the outset that the death 
penalty is constitutional, and that “the Constitution does not demand the avoidance 
of all risk of pain in carrying out executions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. Id. at 1537 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1533–35 (noting 
first that Kentucky has implemented numerous safeguards to prevent the improper 
administration of thiopental, including a requirement that members of execution-by-
lethal-injection teams have at least one year of professional experience; second, that 
no other state uses the one-drug method advanced by the petitioners, “the 
comparative efficacy” of which has not been conclusively established; and third, that 
the states have a “legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death”). 
 112. Id. at 1537 (contesting Justice Stevens’s dissenting characterization of the 
plurality’s opinion as creating uncertainty as to future disposition of other Eighth 
Amendment cases). 
 113. Id. at 1532. 
 114. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the standard articulated by 
the plurality is unsupported by the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment 
and the Court’s method-of-execution precedent). 
 115. See id. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (declining to depart 
from the Court’s precedent upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, and 
finding the petitioners’ evidence insufficient to prove that Kentucky’s protocol 
violates the Eighth Amendment); see also id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the standard articulated by the dissent but concluding that on the 
record before the Court, Kentucky’s protocol did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 116. Id. at 1551–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging his 
respect for precedent establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty and a 
framework for addressing method-of-execution challenges, but expressing his view 
that “the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with 
only marginal contributions to any discernible or social purposes’” (quoting Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring))); see also Linda 
Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punishment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A22 (discussing the historical significance of Justice Stevens’s 
repudiation of the death penalty). 
 117. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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paralytic agent that has generated much of the controversy 
surrounding lethal injection.118  Justices Ginsburg and Souter 
dissented on the grounds that they were not convinced Kentucky had 
taken all the safeguards necessary to prevent an “untoward, readily 
avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.”119  Although 
no clear standard emerged from the splintered decision, the 
“substantial risk” test appears to be the prevailing rule.120
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE 
METHOD-OF-EXECUTION CHALLENGES IS INCONSISTENT WITH  
ITS PROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s proportionality precedents discussed in Part 
I demonstrate that the Court is willing to hear death penalty cases 
and gradually narrow the circumstances under which states may 
authorize the death penalty.  The Court’s steady review of 
proportionality cases stands in stark contrast to its limited review of 
method-of-execution challenges.121  This inconsistency is significant 
because the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment changes as society evolves.122  Interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment’s meaning in light of contemporary values 
should not be limited to questions of whether the penalty of death is 
disproportionate to a particular crime; rather, a proper 
interpretation demands an additional inquiry into the methods used 
to carry out such penalty.123
 
 118. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 119. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 120. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 298 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying the 
“substantial risk” standard to a Virginia inmate’s constitutional challenge to 
execution by lethal injection, asserting that the plurality opinion authored by the 
Chief Justice in Baze “represents the controlling opinion of the Court”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 121. This is not the only inconsistency in the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 321–22 (arguing the Court’s 
avoidance of method-of-execution Eighth Amendment challenges is in “striking 
contrast” with its frequent consideration of the constitutionality of prison conditions 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
 122. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“[A]n assessment of 
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to 
the application of the Eighth Amendment.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) 
(“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 378 (1910) (“[The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] is not fastened to 
the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
humane justice.”). 
 123. But see Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist’s Dilemma:  Establishing the Standards for 
the Evolving Standards of Decency, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 441, 460 (2008) (discussing the 
presumption among courts and commentators that the “evolving standards of 
decency” proportionality standard should be applied to assess method-of-execution 
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In Gregg, the Court asserted that “an assessment of contemporary 
values . . . requires . . . that we look to objective indicia that reflect the 
public attitude toward a given sanction.”124  Thus, in evaluating 
challenges to the death penalty’s proportionality, the Court has 
carefully analyzed objective factors to determine whether a national 
consensus exists favoring the restriction of the death penalty for 
certain offenses or offenders.125  In Baze, however, the Court’s 
examination of objective measures of national consensus was 
comparatively cursory126 and ultimately unpersuasive.127  Further, the 
inconsistency in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
more troubling when considered in light of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause’s original purpose in proscribing torture.128  
While a possible explanation for this incongruity may be the Court’s 
reluctance to grapple with complex medical and scientific issues that 
are perhaps better resolved legislatively, a survey of the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment cases reveals that it has been willing to address 
such issues under other circumstances.129
A. The Supreme Court’s Claimed National Consensus Favoring  
Lethal Injection Is Illusory 
The Court’s argument in Baze, that a national consensus favors the 
use of lethal injection, is unconvincing.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the plurality, suggested that Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection 
protocol reflected a “broad consensus” favoring this method of 
execution, in light of the fact that it is used by a vast majority of states 
administering capital punishment, as well as the Federal 
Government, and is “believed to be the most humane [method-of-
 
challenges, but arguing that the two are not completely analogous:  looking to 
contemporary norms is more appropriate when the “touchstone” of the inquiry is 
moral culpability, unlike method-of-execution challenges in which the “inquiry is 
more practical and focused on physical pain”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. Gregg, 428 U.S at 173. 
 125. See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 123, at 444–45 (discussing the six factors 
measuring “substantive proportionality” the Court has traditionally applied in 
examining whether a death penalty practice is within the evolving standards of 
decency:  (1) history, (2) judicial precedent, (3) statutes, (4) jury sentencing, (5) 
penological goals, and (6) international and comparative law). 
 126. See infra Part II.A (detailing the Baze decision’s shallow analysis). 
 127. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the lack of synchrony between the Baze decision 
and other Supreme Court precedent). 
 128. See supra Part I.A (describing the historical impetus behind the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause); infra Part II.C. 
 129. See infra Part II.D (revealing the Court’s inconsistency by providing examples 
of its willingness to adjudicate highly technical and medical cases in other 
circumstances). 
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execution] available.”130  By citing legislative statistics as evidence of a 
national consensus, the Court tacitly drew from the approach it used 
when it evaluated the death penalty’s proportionality in view of 
“evolving standards of decency” in Coker, Edmunds, Roper, Atkins, and 
later, Kennedy.131  In each of these cases, the Court looked to the 
number of states authorizing or proscribing the death penalty for the 
specific offense or offender at issue to reach its conclusion.132
Absent from the Baze opinion was a critical analysis of any other 
factors indicating that the three-drug lethal injection protocol 
comported with society’s current “standards of decency.”133  Yet, in its 
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence interpreting the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court has looked beyond 
trends reflected in state legislation to other factors reflecting 
contemporary values, such as public opinion,134 sentencing juries,135 
and the laws and practices of other countries.136
 
 130. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532–37 (2008) (plurality opinion) (noting 
“at the outset that it is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it 
is in fact widely tolerated,” and pointing out all thirty-six states that authorize the 
death penalty use lethal injection, and of these, thirty use some combination of 
sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride). 
 131. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“[T]he ‘clearest and 
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by 
the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), 
overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304)). 
 132. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2653 (2008) (“[O]nly six . . . 
jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a child.”); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“[Thirty] States prohibit the juvenile death penalty . . . .”); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (discussing how the execution of the mentally impaired is 
banned in thirty states); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (stating that 
eight jurisdictions had authorized the death penalty for participation in a robbery 
during which an accomplice committed murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
595–96 (1977) (“Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present 
time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman.”). 
 133. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
311–12, for the proposition that the age of the Court’s only three method-of-
execution cases—Wilkerson, Kemmler, and Resweber—diminishes their utility because 
the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency”). 
 134. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (“[A]ttention must be given to the public attitudes 
concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent . . . are to be consulted.”). 
 135. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794 (finding American juries’ unwillingness to 
sentence felony murderers to death reflected a broader societal consensus that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits death for such crimes).  However, although a jury can 
be a reliable indicator of contemporary values, jury sentences are not applicable in 
the method-of-execution context because they have no role in determining how 
states carry out executions.  See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004) 
(explaining that an Eighth Amendment challenge to a method of execution brought 
by a prisoner convicted by a jury and sentenced to death does not directly call into 
question the validity of the sentence itself). 
 136. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (asserting that its conclusion that the juvenile 
death penalty is excessive is validated by the “stark reality” that no other country in 
the world allows it); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting the overwhelming 
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In Atkins, for example, the Court cited additional factors that it 
argued “reflect[ed] a much broader social and professional 
consensus” as support for its conclusion that executing mentally 
retarded offenders was unconstitutional.137  The Court considered 
opposition from several social and professional organizations, 
including the American Psychological Association, the shared views of 
“widely diverse religious communities in the United States,” and 
polling data revealing a broadly held belief among Americans—
including supporters of the death penalty—that execution of 
mentally retarded criminals was wrong.138   
In response to the Court’s grant of certiorari in Baze, several 
medical, religious, and ethical organizations expressed grave 
concerns about the current administration of lethal injection in the 
United States.139  One legal commentator has argued that the medical 
community’s refusal to participate in executions—particularly those 
by lethal injection—”bear[s] on the standards of decency factor.”140  
Although the plurality in Baze acknowledged the current controversy 
surrounding lethal injection, it concluded that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to involve itself in a “best practices” 
 
disapproval by the world community of the execution of mentally impaired 
individuals); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (“It is thus worth noting that the doctrine 
of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in 
Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in 
continental Europe.”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (“[T]he climate of international 
opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment . . . is . . . not 
irrelevant.”).  But see Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
foreign law has no place in the Court’s reasoning and asserting that the majority’s 
reliance on it is inconsistent and serves only to “‘affirm’ . . . the Justices’ own notion 
of how the world ought to be”). 
 137. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Critical Care Providers and Clinical Ethicists in 
Support of Petitioners at 11, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439) 
(arguing against the use of pancuronium bromide in the “end-of-life context” for 
medical and ethical reasons, since it masks any outward signs of stress or pain); Brief 
of the American Ass’n of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (“AAJLJ”) as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 7, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (asserting that the 
“substantial risk” standard is unacceptable under Jewish Law, which requires the 
administration of the method of execution involving the least amount of pain and 
suffering); Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for 
Law and Ethics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, 34, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 
1520 (No. 07-5439) (arguing that the current lethal injection protocol was not the 
product of reasoned consideration, and discussing aspects of the adoption of lethal 
injection which have led to continued suppression of public scrutiny of the 
procedure and its administration). 
 140. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 385 (stating the American Medical 
Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs’ position that physicians are not 
allowed to participate in executions). 
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debate, deferring instead to state legislatures to decide the manner in 
which they administer the death penalty.141
While the Court has looked to statistical evidence of a reduced 
incidence of capital punishment for certain crimes in contemplating 
the death penalty’s excessiveness, it was unwilling to consider 
evidence of a high incidence of botched executions in reviewing a 
method-of-execution challenge in Baze.142  For example in Kennedy, 
the Court looked to execution statistics from other states authorizing 
capital punishment for child rape and found that in each no one had 
been executed for the crime of raping a child since 1964, reinforcing 
the Court’s determination that imposing the death penalty for the 
crime of child rape contradicts contemporary values.143  The Baze 
plurality, however, did not acknowledge the statistical evidence of 
numerous botched executions that have taken place over the past 
several decades in other states administering lethal injection,144 even 
though the petitioners argued that Kentucky’s protocols exposed 
them to the risk of pain in the event of an improper administration 
of the lethal drugs.145  The Court only indirectly addressed the risk of 
a botched execution, drawing on Resweber146 to assert that an “isolated 
mishap alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment 
violation.”147
Further, while Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion regarding lethal 
injection’s near universal use in death penalty states is of course 
factually correct, it is difficult to maintain that modern lethal 
injection procedures comport with contemporary standards of 
decency when there is very little the public actually knows about 
them.148  Although recent botched executions, like that of Joseph 
 
 141. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text. 
 143. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2657–58 (2008); see Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (pointing out that only six states have executed juveniles 
since the decision in Stanford); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (stating that in states 
with no express prohibition on capital punishment for mentally impaired offenders, 
only five such executions have taken place since 1989). 
 144. See RADELET, supra note 3. 
 145. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530–31. 
 146. 329 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1947) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that “because 
he once underwent the psychological strain of preparation for electrocution, 
[requiring] him to undergo this preparation again subjects him to a lingering or 
cruel and unusual punishment”).  See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court’s refusal in Resweber to find an Eight Amendment violation 
given the instant facts). 
 147. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (citing Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463–64, in response to the 
petitioners’ claim that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol exposes prisoners to the 
risk of “severe pain” if the drugs are not properly administered). 
 148. See Alper, supra note 83, at 1–2 (discussing lethal injection’s “sordid” and 
“skimpy” history and the fact that, because people presumed lethal injection was safe 
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Lewis Clark, have attracted media attention and shed more light on 
the procedures states use to administer capital punishment, there is 
still a significant lack of transparency attending the lethal injection 
process.149
Some commentators attribute the secrecy surrounding lethal 
injection first to a concern by states that public awareness of their 
execution protocols will expose them to increased capital 
punishment litigation,150 and, second, to “blissful ignorance” on the 
part of the public to the practical realities of specific execution 
mechanisms.151  Regardless, this lack of information complicates 
efforts to review the constitutionality of lethal injection protocols.152  
Thus, even if the Court had attempted to gauge public opinion, by, 
for example, considering polling data similar to that it relied upon in 
Atkins, such an analysis would be of questionable probative value 
given that the public is largely ill-informed.153  Moreover, it is perhaps 
easier for the public to understand and make a judgment as to which 
criminals deserve to be executed than about the medically complex 
procedures used to carry out those executions. 
 
and humane, little attention was paid to its adoption and “the automatic 
transparency that typically attends legislative action was absent”).  But see Baze, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1527 n.1 (acknowledging the three-drug lethal injection protocol was adopted 
by states “without significant independent review,” but arguing that the move to this 
method of execution was “motivated by a desire to find a more humane alternative to 
then-existing methods”). 
 149. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 95–96 (detailing the limited public 
availability of states’ specific lethal injection protocols); see also Douglas A. Berman & 
Alison J. Nathan, Debate, Baze-D and Confused:  What’s the Deal with Lethal Injection?, 
Debate, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 312, 316–17 (2008), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/lethalinjection.pdf (discussing the three 
reasons for the limited public awareness of lethal injection procedures:  (1) the 
paralytic agent masks any outward, physical signs of suffering, causing the media 
witnessing executions to convey a “sanitized version” to the public, (2) specific lethal 
injection protocols are developed by prison officials and often exempted from 
administrative review, and (3) states “tenaciously guard[] the information as secret 
and nonpublic”). 
 150. See Berman & Nathan, supra note 149, at 322 (“State officials believe, quite 
justifiably, that any information-sharing good deed will be punished through new 
rounds of litigation brought by death row defendants and death penalty 
opponents.”). 
 151. See id. at 323. 
 152. See id. at 328 (arguing that the national consensus analysis is frustrated in the 
method-of-execution context because of the lack of transparency and public 
knowledge due to states’ refusal to release information about lethal injection 
protocols and procedures, and asserting that it is up to the Supreme Court to “probe 
the[se] troubling realities”). 
 153. See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (detailing the lack of 
information that is available to the public regarding lethal injection procedures). 
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B. Legislation Is Unreliable as an Objective Indicator  
of Lethal Injection’s Acceptability 
The plurality’s reliance on state legislation as the sole indicator 
that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol is “objectively []tolerable”154 
raises several concerns.  While legislation is generally considered the 
strongest indicator of a national consensus,155 it is less persuasive in 
the context of method-of-execution challenges than in cases assessing 
proportionality.  This is because most states with lethal injection 
enacted generalized legislation to implement it, meanwhile 
delegating development of the specific execution protocols to 
untrained prison personnel.156  As Justice Stevens acknowledged in his 
concurring opinion in Baze, “[i]n the majority of States that use the 
three-drug protocol, the drugs were selected by unelected 
Department of Correction officials with no specialized medical 
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or 
guidance.”157  Thus, while decisions of democratically-elected bodies 
concerning punishments are considered presumptively valid in the 
face of a constitutional challenge,158 Stevens argued that the “drug 
selections [adopted by states using lethal injection] are not entitled 
to the kind of deference afforded legislative decisions.”159
 
 154. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 155. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“[The] clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country’s legislatures.”) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), 
overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304). 
 156. See Denno, Legislatures, supra note 24, at 116–23 (explaining the vagueness of 
most lethal injection statutes, the majority of which fail to list the quantity of the 
various chemicals used or specify information on the quality or training of execution 
officials). 
 157. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(pointing out that only a third of the states with lethal injection expressly authorize 
the use of a chemical paralytic agent, such as pancuronium bromide, arguing that 
the failure of states or Congress to prohibit its use should not be considered “a 
nationwide endorsement of an unnecessarily dangerous practice,” and asserting that 
pancuronium bromide’s specific authorization by some state legislatures was more 
the product of a “stereotyped reaction” than “a careful analysis of relevant 
considerations favoring or disfavoring” its adoption) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 
U.S. 495, 520–21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 158. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1976) (“[I]n assessing a 
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional 
measure, we presume its validity. . . . And a heavy burden rests on those who would 
attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. . . . The deference we owe 
to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system is enhanced where 
the specification of punishments is concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of 
legislative policy.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 
393 (1958))). 
 159. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Moreover, state legislation, when used as an indicator of national 
consensus, should be considered within the broader context of the 
information and time for in-depth inquiry available to states at the 
time of its passage.160  The suggestion of a national consensus favoring 
Kentucky’s three-drug protocol as the preferred method of execution 
is difficult to substantiate when viewed in light of the haphazard way 
lethal injection was developed—without medical or scientific 
study161—and the budget concern justifications for its adoption in 
many states.162  The questionable reliability of legislation alone as a 
reflection of societal values concerning lethal injection weakens the 
Baze plurality’s conclusion that Kentucky’s execution protocol is 
“widely tolerated” nationally.163
C. The Court’s Limited Review of Method-of-Execution Challenges Is 
Contrary to the Original Understanding of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause 
The inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s limited review of 
method-of-execution challenges as compared to its more critical 
proportionality jurisprudence is also at odds with the Eighth 
Amendment’s original purpose.  The drafters of the Constitution 
“were primarily concerned . . . with proscribing ‘tortures’ and other 
‘barbarous’ methods of punishment.”164  Indeed, the Framers 
intended that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be 
adopted to “prohibit[] certain methods of punishment”165 and was not 
expanded to encompass disproportionate punishments until the 1910 
case of Weems v. United States.166  As Justice White argued in his dissent 
in Weems, “it may not be doubted, and indeed is not questioned by 
 
 160. See Aarons, supra note 123, at 449 (arguing that legislation is not always a 
sound indicator of public values because “[l]egislators often face stark policy choices 
and frequently compromise to resolve their differences”). 
 161. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 70 (describing the development of 
lethal injection by two Oklahoma legislators and the state’s Chief Medical 
Examiner). 
 162. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 374 (discussing economics as a “major 
impetus” behind the adoption of lethal injection because it was significantly less 
expensive than electrocution and lethal gas). 
 163. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532–33 (plurality opinion). 
 164. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) (attributing this fact to 
statements made by Patrick Henry at Virginia’s constitutional convention, as well as 
similar concerns raised at the Massachusetts convention) (citation omitted). 
 165. Granucci, supra note 26, at 842 (emphasis added). 
 166. 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see id. at 383 (White, J., dissenting) (holding that a 
sentence of twelve years hard labor was disproportionate to the crime of falsifying 
official public records and therefore “repugnant to the Bill of Rights”); Granucci, 
supra note 26, at 842–43 (explaining the history of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause). 
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anyone, that the cruel punishments against which the Bill of Rights 
provided were the atrocious, sanguinary, and inhuman punishments 
which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons of criminals.”167  
This interpretation of the Eighth Amendment was also echoed by 
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Baze, when he argued 
that the Framers’ intention in adopting the Eighth Amendment—to 
prevent “torturous modes of punishment”—has “permeated” the 
Court’s method-of-execution jurisprudence.168
A consideration of the Eighth Amendment’s original 
understanding suggests that avoiding painful executions is more 
aligned with preventing torture, the purpose of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, than with limiting the death penalty’s 
reach.169  It would thus seem that evidence pointing to the possibility 
of an excruciatingly painful death would attract as much, if not more, 
exacting scrutiny by our nation’s highest Court—in an effort to be 
faithful to the purpose and intent of the Eighth Amendment—than 
the more general analysis of the types of crimes and criminals eligible 
for death. 
Indeed, original intent has been an important component of the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in other areas of its jurisprudence, 
particularly the Second Amendment.170  In District of Columbia v. 
Heller,171 a case decided just a few months after Baze, the Supreme 
Court struck down a District of Columbia gun control law, holding 
that it violated the Second Amendment’s protection of an 
individual’s right to bear arms.172  The Court relied heavily on the 
Second Amendment’s original understanding to reach its conclusion, 
including analyzing the meaning of the phrases “keep arms” and 
“bear arms” at use during the period that the Amendment was 
 
 167. Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting). 
 168. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556, 1556–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (discussing the Framers’ debates and early commentary on the 
Constitution as evidence that the Eighth Amendment was originally understood as 
prohibiting “torturous punishments,” and arguing that the plurality’s “substantial 
risk” standard was inconsistent with this original understanding). 
 169. See supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text (discussing the Framers’ 
concern with prohibiting types of punishment and distinguishing it from the Court’s 
current concern with who can be exposed to the death penalty). 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”). 
 171. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 172. Id. at 2822–23.  Heller was significant in that it marked the first time in history 
that the Supreme Court invalidated a gun control law on the grounds that it violated 
the Second Amendment.  See Cameron Desmond, Comment, From Cities to 
Schoolyards:  The Implications of an Individual Right To Bear Arms on the Constitutionality 
of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2008). 
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adopted, the Amendment’s legislative history, and commentary by 
legal scholars immediately following the Amendment’s ratification.173  
Thus, the Baze plurality’s failure to give weight to the Eighth 
Amendment’s original purpose stands in contrast to the Court’s 
critical analysis of original intent in interpreting other controversial 
constitutional questions. 
D. Medical and Scientific Considerations Do Not Offer  
a Compelling Justification for the Court’s Reluctance To Critically Analyze 
Execution Methods 
One possible explanation for the Court’s reluctance to critically 
address method-of-execution challenges, in contrast to its 
proportionality jurisprudence, is a sense by the Court that a more 
exacting review of execution protocols would involve complex 
medical and scientific judgments, which are perhaps better left to 
states to resolve legislatively.  Indeed, the Baze plurality argued as 
much when it rejected the petitioners’ submission that evidence of a 
“slightly or marginally safer alternative” method would be enough to 
prove Kentucky’s three-drug protocol violated the Eighth 
Amendment.174
This reasoning is inconsistent with the Court’s willingness to make 
medical and scientific judgments in earlier cases in which it reviewed 
Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty’s 
proportionality.175  In Atkins, for example, the Court examined 
various clinical measures of mental retardation, including medical 
definitions, psychological assessments, and the results of intelligence 
tests to assess the defendant’s criminal culpability.176  Similarly, the 
Court in Roper drew on social science research findings that juveniles 
are more predisposed to reckless behavior than adults and less able to 
appreciate the negative consequences of their actions as support for 
its conclusion that juveniles should not be subjected to death, which 
it argued should only be reserved for the “worst offenders.”177  Thus, 
the Court has demonstrated the ability in other areas of its Eighth 
 
 173. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792–805. 
 174. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (arguing 
that it would be ill-advised for the Court to become “embroil[ed] . . . in ongoing 
scientific controversies beyond their expertise”); see also id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]omparative-risk standards . . . require courts to resolve medical and 
scientific controversies that are largely beyond the judicial ken.”). 
 175. See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s use of 
scientific evidence in the determination to disallow the use of the death penalty for 
the mentally retarded and juveniles). 
 176. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308–09 nn.3–5 (2002). 
 177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
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Amendment jurisprudence to engage in scientific debates exceeding 
its expertise, particularly in cases where such evidence supported its 
conclusion.178  The Baze plurality, however, acknowledged the 
controversy surrounding the Lancet study,179 but declined to “take 
sides in this dispute.”180
This inconsistency is troubling in light of the fact that a thorough 
consideration of the constitutionality of methods of execution must 
be informed by medical and scientific judgments.181  By avoiding a 
more critical examination of the available medical and scientific 
evidence, the Court has made it less clear how lower courts should 
analyze what specifically amounts to a “risk of severe pain” or what 
protocols would be considered “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s.182
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAZE DECISION 
The constitutional standard for reviewing method-of-execution 
challenges that the Court articulated in Baze was borrowed from an 
earlier ruling in Farmer v. Brennan,183 a case involving an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to prison conditions.  The petitioner in Farmer 
was a transsexual prisoner projecting female characteristics who was 
beaten and raped after being transferred to an all-male state 
penitentiary known for its violence and history of assaults.184  The 
petitioner argued that federal prison officials were aware of the 
petitioner’s vulnerability under these circumstances and acted with 
“deliberate indifference” to the petitioner’s safety in violation of the 
 
 178. See, e.g., id. at 569–71 (noting that sociological studies detailing juveniles’ 
“lack of maturity and . . . underdeveloped sense of responsibility” supported the 
Court’s conclusion that juveniles should not face the death penalty); Atkins, 536 U.S. 
at 318–19 (relying on clinical definitions to determine that mentally retarded 
defendants have a reduced culpability and consequently should not be subjected to 
the death penalty); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 835 n.42 (1988) 
(utilizing a professional report, which discussed the psychological conditions of 
juveniles on death row, to support the contention that juveniles are less culpable). 
 179. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Lancet study as 
an illustration of the problems with the use of the three-drug lethal injection 
protocol). 
 180. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 n.2 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 181. See id. at 1570 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Considering that the 
constitutionality of Kentucky’s protocol depends on guarding against the . . . risk [of 
consciousness during otherwise painful procedures], the plurality’s reluctance to 
consider medical practice is puzzling.  No one is advocating the wholesale 
incorporation of medical standards into the Eighth Amendment . . . . That medical 
professionals consider such [additional safeguards] important enough to make it the 
standard of care in medical practice, I remain persuaded, is highly instructive.”). 
 182. See Liptak, supra note 108 (discussing the uncertainty created by the Court’s 
“fractured decision” in Baze and the likelihood of increased capital litigation). 
 183. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 184. Id. at 831. 
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Eighth Amendment.185  The Court held that a prison official violates 
the Eighth Amendment “for denying humane conditions of 
confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of 
serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 
measures to abate it.”186
Arguably, a “substantial risk” of inmate assault—while indeed 
grave—is different from that of an excruciatingly painful execution.  
The main concern with this standard, however, is that it is subjective.  
It is not clear exactly what the Baze plurality meant by “substantial 
risk” and “serious harm” in the context of administering capital 
punishment.187  This is problematic because, preferably, courts should 
rely on objective factors as much as possible in considering an Eighth 
Amendment challenge.188
The Court’s decision to use the challenge by the Kentucky 
petitioners in Baze to clarify the constitutional standard for method-
of-execution challenges also has implications for future judicial 
review of state execution protocols.  The record in Kentucky was not 
developed—there had been only one execution by lethal injection at 
the time Baze was decided189—making Baze an arguably poor test case 
for considering the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is 
currently administered.190  The Court’s splintered ruling not only 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 847. 
 187. See Liptak, supra note 108 (noting worries that “[t]he court is giving different 
messages” in regards to Eight Amendment jurisprudence). 
 188. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment 
judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual 
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible 
extent.”). 
 189.  Kentucky carried out its second execution by lethal injection on November 21, 
2008, when it executed convicted child-killer Marco Allen Chapman.  Jason Riley, 
Chapman Executed for ’02 Slayings, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Kentucky), Nov. 
22, 2008, at 1A.   
 190. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 803–04 (“[T]he suit brought by the petitioners 
had not been subjected to the thorough federal hearings conducted in similar cases 
that were under way in California and Missouri.  The hearings in Kentucky were 
instead held in state court, and considered only Kentucky’s procedures, not the vast 
array of problems that had arisen in other states.”); see also Shah, supra note 6, at 
1141 (arguing that it is paradoxical that Kentucky, a state with minimal experience 
administering lethal injection and which proscribes physician involvement in 
executions, “is to serve as the model for states with far more experience in this area 
and prior physician involvement”).  Moreover, because the plurality suggested that 
states whose execution protocols were “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s would 
survive constitutional review, see Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537–38 (2008) (“A 
State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold 
today would not create a risk that meets this standard.”), states defending against 
challenges to their execution methods could simply alter their protocols to avoid 
judicial scrutiny.  Such a response could potentially impede a more critical analysis of 
whether a state’s protocol involves a “substantial risk of serious harm.” 
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makes increased lethal injection litigation more likely,191 it also 
creates uncertainty as to how the Court might resolve a hypothetical 
future challenge to another state’s protocol in which there is more 
documented evidence on execution procedures, including possible 
evidence of botched procedures.192  The sparse documented evidence 
available in Baze and the lack of a clear, objective constitutional 
standard is legally problematic because it means that states preparing 
for or responding to method-of-execution challenges are left with 
limited insight into how courts might resolve the issue going 
forward.193
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Baze, despite its historical 
significance, did not conclusively resolve the confusion surrounding 
constitutional challenges to methods of execution.  Thus, states going 
forward with lethal injection should develop objective criteria to 
ensure their protocols do not pose a “substantial risk” of unnecessary 
pain in light of feasible alternatives. 
States should evaluate medical evidence on the risk of pain 
involved,194 documentation on botched executions, and medical and 
scientific testimony on the feasibility and safety of alternative 
methods to determine whether their protocols pass constitutional 
muster.  Further, recognizing the limitations of individual federal 
judges’ ability to review complicated medical data on a case-by-case 
 
 191. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text (noting concern that the 
Court’s ruling will lead to increased litigation). 
 192. See Joan Biskupic, Ky. Ruling Leaves Room for Future Tests of Issue, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 17, 2008, at 7A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/ 
judicial/2008-04-16Lethalinside_N.htm (discussing how the chances of success for 
lethal injection challengers may increase long-term with more developed evidence of 
botched executions and other problems with lethal injection). 
 193. Challenges to the constitutionality of lethal injection procedures are already 
under way in several other states, and this trend will likely continue.  See Emmett v. 
Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 302, 308 (2008) (applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Baze to reject a challenge to Virginia’s three-drug lethal injection protocol, arguing 
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Virginia’s protocol posed a “substantial 
or objectively intolerable risk of severe pain” and did not show that the alternative 
one-drug protocol was “feasible or readily implemented”); see also Adam Liptak & 
Adam B. Ellick, Judge Orders Ohio To Alter Its Method of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2008, at A16 (discussing an Ohio judge’s order that the state’s execution protocols 
be changed, conceding that current procedure would fail under Baze); Sean 
O’Sullivan, Judge Continues Death Penalty Stay for Delaware, NEWS J., May 15, 2008, at 1B 
(explaining a decision by a federal judge in Delaware to suspend executions pending 
a hearing on the similarities between the Delaware and Kentucky procedures). 
 194. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 77, at 478 (suggesting that states should 
consider the “period of time it takes for unconsciousness to occur” to better 
understand the risk of pain accompanying lethal injection). 
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basis,195 states charged with ensuring the constitutionality of their 
protocols should conduct legislative hearings or appoint task forces 
to develop specific guidelines for their execution protocols, relying 
on the objective factors discussed above.  States should not defer to 
prison personnel to develop and carry out procedures that implicate 
important constitutional questions.196  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts, 
concluding his plurality opinion in Baze, hinted that the outcome of 
this case signals an opportunity for states to engage in a thoughtful 
debate over and examination of execution protocols to ensure that 
lethal injection is carried out as humanely as possible.197
In addition, courts reviewing the constitutionality of execution 
procedures and lawyers litigating such challenges should insist on 
transparency and demand that state lethal injection protocols are 
made available to the public.198  As one federal judge pointed out in a 
recent law review article, “[i]n examining the evolving standards of 
decency, we cannot expect the public’s standards to evolve if the 
public is unaware of what procedures are actually performed upon 
the condemned.”199  This could be achieved by states releasing the 
findings of legislative committees or task forces and, ultimately, 
enacting more specific legislation giving explicit directives to prison 
officials on how executions are to be carried out. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a gradual 
willingness to limit the classes of crimes and criminals eligible for 
 
 195. See, e.g., Berman supra note 92, at 327 (arguing that federal courts are ill-
equipped to “sort[] through alternative execution technologies, debatable medical 
evidence, and the administrative issues that states face in carrying out scheduled 
executions” and are more effective in serving as “watch-dog[s]” to prevent against the 
use of questionable execution methods). 
 196. See supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text (noting how most specific 
lethal injection procedures are not determined by elected officials). 
 197. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“The broad 
framework of the Eighth Amendment has accommodated this progress toward more 
humane methods of execution, and our approval of a particular method in the past 
has not precluded legislatures from taking the steps they deem appropriate, in light 
of new developments, to ensure humane capital punishment.  There is no reason to 
suppose that today’s decision will be any different.”). 
 198. Attorneys for Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling have initiated another 
challenge in Kentucky state court, this time arguing the State’s lethal injection 
protocol should be made public.  See Dave Spencer, Two Death Row Cases Back in 
Kentucky Supreme Court, Oct. 16, 2008, WTYK.COM, http://www.wkyt.com/home/ 
headlines/31129604.html. 
 199. See Gaitan, supra note 76, at 786–87 (discussing recommendations for 
improved transparency and oversight of lethal injection, including detailed and 
public written protocols, which he argues would “significantly ease the burdens on 
the courts and litigants” in future lethal injection litigation). 
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capital punishment.  The Court has prohibited the death penalty for 
juveniles and the mentally retarded and held capital punishment 
unconstitutional for the crime of rape, felony murder where the 
defendant did not kill or intend to kill, and child rape.200  This trend 
in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is inconsistent with 
its historical reluctance to critically examine the specific procedures 
states use to carry out the death penalty. 
The Court’s less rigorous review of method-of-execution challenges 
was demonstrated by its splintered ruling upholding Kentucky’s 
lethal injection mechanism in Baze.201  The Baze plurality did not 
thoroughly analyze relevant evidence of whether lethal injection, as it 
is carried out today, is objectively tolerable to our society.  Yet the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent mandates that determinations 
of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” be consistent 
with our contemporary values.202  While the Court based its 
conclusion in part on the fact that the vast majority of States with 
capital punishment use the three-drug protocol at issue in Baze, this 
analysis is less persuasive in this context, given the manner in which 
states adopted lethal injection and the public’s limited understanding 
of the issue.  In addition, this incongruity raises further constitutional 
questions in light of the Eighth Amendment’s original purpose of 
preventing tortuous punishments.  Finally, while the Court in Baze 
seemed to justify its conclusion by arguing that the judicial branch is 
ill-suited to make determinations on complex medical and scientific 
judgments, this reasoning is inconsistent with the Court’s willingness 
to engage in the debate over controversial medical and scientific 
issues in making determinations as to the death penalty’s 
excessiveness. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Baze in some ways seemed to raise 
as many constitutional questions as it answered.  In light of the lack of 
a clear standard set forth by the Supreme Court, states facing 
renewed constitutional challenges to their execution methods in the 
wake of Baze would do well to take a hard look at their execution 
protocols and, drawing on objective evidence to the fullest extent 
possible, consider ways in which they might be strengthened.
 
 200. See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text (discussing the development of 
cases that began determining which defendants and which crimes warranted the 
death penalty). 
 201. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1571–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting on the 
Court’s acceptance of Kentucky’s protocol despite the procedure’s failure to include 
many safety measures). 
 202. See supra notes 130–132 (noting the Court’s reliance on public opinion in 
justifying the allowance of certain lethal injection methods). 
